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LAWLESS BY DESIGN: JURISDICTION, GENDER AND 
JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
[O]ur method of dealing with [murder] was Crow Dog should go take 
care of Spotted Tail’s family, and if he didn’t do that we’d banish 
him from the tribe.  But that was considered too barbaric . . . so they 
passed the Major Crimes Act that said we don’t know how to handle 
murderers and they were going to show us.1 
[I]f you want to rape or kill somebody and get away with it, do it on 
an Indian reservation.2 
American Indian men and women report more violent victimization than 
any other racial or ethnic group in the United States.3  Homicide victimization 
rates, for example, are two times higher for American Indians than for persons 
of any other ethnic group.4  Complex jurisdictional laws hamper attempts to 
reduce these crimes.  In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme 
Court held that tribal governments do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, even when they commit crimes against tribe members on 
American Indian reservations.5  Moreover, while tribes can prosecute Indian 
defendants, they are not authorized to impose a fine greater than five thousand 
dollars or a jail sentence that is longer than one year.6  Such restrictions 
functionally limit tribal jurisdiction to misdemeanors.7 
 
 1 Tribal Courts Act of 1991 and Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Entitled “Indian Civil 
Rights Act”: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102nd Cong. 42 (1991) (testimony of Wayne 
Ducheneaux, President, National Congress of American Indians). 
 2 Wetzelbill, I Was Witness to One on My Reservation, Comment to One in Three Native American 
Women Will Be Raped in Her Lifetime, DEMOCRATICUNDERGROUND.COM (July 26, 2007, 8:06 PM), 
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=389x1446613#1446807. 
 3 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
SURVEY iv (2000). 
 4 See id. at 23 (discussing the results of a study by the National Center for Injury Prevention and 
Control). 
 5 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978). 
 6 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006). 
 7 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 681 (1990) (“The tribal criminal code is therefore confined to 
misdemeanors.”).  
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Federal and state governments have not filled the vacuum in law 
enforcement created by this limitation.  The federal government has a trust 
responsibility to police Indian Country,8 but its jurisdiction is limited to federal 
and major crimes.9  Public Law 280 (PL 280) provides fifteen states with 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian Country.10  Thus, in PL 280 
states, tribal governments have jurisdiction over misdemeanor crimes 
committed by Indians, state officials can prosecute any crime, and the federal 
government maintains jurisdiction over federal and major crimes.  Yet, despite 
this array of authorities, few crimes against Indians that occur on reservations 
are prosecuted. 
Due to confusion over jurisdiction, law enforcement response in Indian 
Country is complex, uncoordinated, and ineffective.11  Determining 
jurisdiction over any given crime committed in Indian Country “depends on 
the identity of the victim and the offender, the severity of the crime, and where 
 
 8 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) defines “Indian Country” as 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United 
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within 
or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not 
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 
There are 4.3 million people in the United States who identify as American Indians in whole or in part.  U.S. 
Census Bureau, WE THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA NATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2006).  
There are 562 federally recognized tribes in the United States today, and tribes hold approximately fifty 
million acres, or around two percent of the United States.  Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians, An Introduction to 
Indian Nations in the United States, NCAI.ORG, 13, http://www.ncai.org/fileadmin/initiatives/NCAI_ 
Indian_Nations_In_The_US.pdf (last visited July 30, 2010). 
 9 See infra Part I.A. 
 10 Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) and 25 U.S.C. § 1321 
(2006)).  The “mandatory” states include California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, which 
were listed in the original statute, id., and Alaska, which assumed jurisdiction upon statehood.  Pub. L. No. 85-
615, 72 Stat. 545 (1958) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006)).  Public Law 280 provides that other states can 
choose to assume jurisdiction; these states are called “optional” states.  States that have assumed jurisdiction or 
taken steps to assume jurisdiction include Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.430 (2009); Idaho, IDAHO CODE 
ANN. §§ 67-5101, 5103 (2010); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 1.12 to .14 (2010); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 37.12.010 (2010); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-1-17 to -18 (2010); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 2-1-301 (2009); North Dakota Const. Art. XIII, § 2 (2010); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-9-201 (West 2010); 
and Florida, FLA. STAT. § 285.16 (2010).  Before 1968, states could unilaterally assume jurisdiction , but 
amendments to PL 280 now require that any state assuming jurisdiction acquire tribal consent.  Indian Civil 
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (a) (2006). 
 11 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY xii (2003), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/na0703/na0204.pdf [hereinafter A QUIET CRISIS] 
(calling the government’s failure “systemic” due to jurisdictional overlap, inadequate collaboration, 
inefficiency, service delays, and wasted resources). 
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the crime occurred.”12  In these circumstances, federal and state officials may 
be unsure about their powers.  Thus, non-Indians who commit crimes on tribal 
lands may go unpunished,13 making Indian Country residents choice targets for 
criminals14 and projecting an image that criminals can attack Indian Country 
residents with impunity.15 
This patchwork of legal authority has led to a breakdown of law and order 
in Indian Country.16  While this climate endangers the entire American Indian 
population, women suffer the most.  American Indian women are the most 
victimized group in America;17 their rate of violent victimization is more than 
twice that of all women.18  Indian and Alaska Native women are the most 
likely group to report rape and physical assault.19  While violence against 
women is underreported in every demographic,20 jurisdictional barriers add 
one more obstacle between victims and law enforcement in Indian Country.  
This is particularly devastating to American Indian women since at least 70% 
of sexual assault perpetrators are non-Indian men.21 
 
 12 Id. at 67. 
 13 Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 128 
(2004). 
 14 Victor H. Holcomb, Prosecution of Non-Indians for Non-Serious Offenses Committed Against Indians 
in Indian Country, 75 N.D. L. REV. 761, 761 (1999). 
 15 See id. at 779 (describing “an alarming picture of increasing violent crime on reservations due to 
insufficient quality and quantity of protective law enforcement”).  Almost instantly after Oliphant was 
decided, advocates argued that the decision would hurt law enforcement in Indian Country.  See, e.g., Russel 
Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the 
Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 636 (1979) (describing the decision as “depriv[ing] tribal 
governments of the only power they have to protect themselves: orderly tribal legal process”); A QUIET CRISIS, 
supra note 11, at 67 (arguing that this confusion constitutes an abrogation of the federal government’s 
responsibilities, making Native Americans “easy crime targets”). 
 16 See A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 79. 
 17 See id. at 67 (“The rate of victimization of Native American women is 50 percent higher than the next 
highest group, African American males.”). 
 18 STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND 
CRIME, at v (2004). 
 19 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 3, at iv. 
 20 See id. at iii–v (describing “many gaps in [the] understanding of violence against women”). 
 21 See Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and Federal 
Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 457 (2005) (observing that in rapes involving American Indian 
women, “over 70% of the assailants are white”); see also PERRY, supra note 18, at 9 (“Nearly 4 in 5 American 
Indian victims of rape/sexual assault described the offender as white.”).  The majority of violent crime in 
Indian Country is perpetrated by non-Indians.  Id. (“When asked the race of their offender, American Indian 
victims of violent crime primarily said the offender was white (57%), followed by other race (34%) and black 
(9%).”).  In contrast, violent crime against whites and African Americans is primarily intraracial.  Id. 
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To reduce crime, and sexual violence in particular, in Indian Country, 
Congress should “overturn” Oliphant and grant tribes direct criminal 
jurisdiction over all people—Indian or not—in Indian Country.  Congress 
should also remove sentencing limits and explicitly grant tribal courts authority 
to adjudicate all crimes.  Accordingly, Part I discusses the effects of present 
legal hurdles to prosecuting those who commit crimes in Indian Country.  Part 
II shows how Congress could remove these legal barriers.  Part III addresses 
possible constitutional concerns about this proposal.  Part IV outlines the legal 
benefits of this proposal, including a more harmonized and modern legal 
framework that enhances tribal institutions and sovereignty.  Part IV also 
articulates the law enforcement benefits of greater reliance on tribal authorities, 
and it explains why tribes are better equipped than states to respond to sexual 
violence and why an indigenous response to rape is crucial to strengthening 
tribal institutions. 
I. CURRENT JURISDICTIONAL LAW GOVERNING CRIME IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
The federal government first assumed responsibility for policing Indian 
Country more than one hundred years ago with the passage of the Major 
Crimes Act.22  Today, federal statutes limit the types of crimes that tribal 
courts may prosecute, and the Supreme Court has imposed limits on whom 
tribal courts may prosecute.  A third actor—the states—may sometimes 
enforce only some of its laws in Indian Country.  These jurisdictional divisions 
make policing Indian Country a unique challenge23 and, in particular, thwart 
the already difficult task of combating sexual violence. 
A. Federal Limits: What Tribes May Prosecute 
In 1885, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act (MCA), giving the federal 
government jurisdiction over certain crimes committed in Indian Country, 
including rape.24  Congress drafted the MCA in response to an 1883 Supreme 
 
 22 See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984) (providing an historical overview of the Major Crimes Act); see also Act of 
Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)). 
 23 A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 66. 
 24 See sources cited supra note 22.  The MCA covers murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, 
incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious 
bodily injury, assault perpetrated against anyone under age sixteen, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, 
burglary, robbery, any felony under section 661 of title 18 that occurs within Indian Country, and any felony 
under chapter 109(A), which includes rape.  18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). 
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Court decision limiting federal jurisdiction over members of Indian tribes.25  
Tribal authorities had convicted Crow Dog, an American Indian, of murdering 
another American Indian in Indian Country, and they demanded restitution 
instead of incarcerating him.26  Unsatisfied with this result, the federal 
government attempted to prosecute Crow Dog in its own courts.27  The 
Supreme Court held that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to try Crow 
Dog.28  In response, Congress enacted the MCA to empower U.S. courts to 
impose their own penalties for offenses committed in Indian Country.29 
There is disagreement over whether tribal governments retain any authority 
to prosecute crimes listed in the MCA.  Commentators argue that the MCA 
created concurrent jurisdiction between federal courts and tribal governments 
but did not divest tribes of authority to prosecute these crimes.30  Yet at least 
one federal appellate court has read the MCA to exclude tribal jurisdiction over 
any American Indian defendant charged with any of the MCA-enumerated 
crimes.31  The Supreme Court has recognized there is ambiguity in the statute 
but has so far refused to address it.32 
A 1968 statute, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), rendered this question 
functionally moot33 by limiting the punishments tribes can impose.34  For any 
crime, a tribal court may not sentence a defendant to more than one year in 
 
 25 Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); see also B.J. Jones, Jurisdiction and Violence Against 
Native Women, in SHARING OUR STORIES OF SURVIVAL: NATIVE WOMEN SURVIVING VIOLENCE 233, 237 
(Sarah Deer et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter SHARING OUR STORIES] (noting that the MCA was passed “after the 
U.S. Supreme Court declared . . . that Indian tribes had the exclusive authority to punish Indians who 
committed crimes against other Indians within the tribe’s lands”). 
 26 Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557; Jones, supra note 25, at 237. 
 27 Jones, supra note 25, at 237. 
 28 Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572. 
 29 Some circuits have concluded that the MCA also allows for the prosecution of crimes committed by 
American Indians against corporations.  See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 572 F.3d 1162, 1169–70 (10th Cir. 
2009). 
 30 See, e.g., Deer, supra note 21, at 460 (“Interestingly, the Major Crimes Act itself never explicitly 
stripped the tribe of jurisdiction over the list of crimes.”). 
 31 See, e.g., Sam v. United States, 385 F.2d 213, 214 (10th Cir. 1967) (describing a rape case as being 
“beyond the jurisdiction” of a tribal court). 
 32 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 689 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 
(1978). 
 33 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 681 (“The tribal criminal code is therefore confined to misdemeanors.”).  
However, tribes can still exclude or banish non-Indians from the reservation.  Cf. id. at 689 (suggesting a 
defendant could acquiesce to tribal jurisdiction . . . “for example, in return for a tribe’s agreement not to 
exercise its power to exclude an offender from tribal lands”); Brenda Hill, The Role of Advocates in the Tribal 
Legal System: Context Is Everything, in SHARING OUR STORIES, supra note 25, at 193, 211. 
 34 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006). 
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prison and/or impose a fine of more than five thousand dollars.35  Historically, 
tribal governments have not been bound by constitutional restraints.36  In the 
wake of increasing concern over civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s, Congress 
passed the ICRA so that Indians could protect themselves37 “from arbitrary and 
unjust actions of tribal governments.”38 
The MCA’s ambiguous extension of federal jurisdiction may have created a 
de jure barrier to tribal jurisdiction, while the ICRA’s sentencing limits have 
created a de facto incentive for tribes to focus on minor crimes.  While tribal 
courts may still impose other sanctions for criminal conduct—for example, 
restitution, probation, or banishment—the ICRA limits the ability of tribes to 
impose fines and incarceration.39  Hence, tribal governments focus their 
limited resources on other crimes while hoping that the federal government 
will prosecute rape and other offenses enumerated in the MCA.40 
B. Federal Limits: Whom Tribes May Prosecute 
Not only has Congress restricted which crimes tribal courts can prosecute, 
but the Supreme Court has also restricted the persons whom tribal courts can 
prosecute.  Because tribes were once wholly independent political entities, they 
have inherent government power that does not come from the federal 
government.41  Once incorporated into the United States, tribes kept this source 
of power but also became dependent sovereigns.42  Supreme Court cases of the 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 679 (noting that Duro, a nonmember of the tribe, was not “entitled to vote in 
Pima-Maricopa elections, to hold tribal office, or to serve on tribal juries”); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194 
(explaining that while under the ICRA “defendants are entitled to many of the due process protections 
accorded to defendants in federal or state criminal proceedings. . . . the guarantees are not identical” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 37 Today we speak only of Indians needing to be protected from abusive tribal governments because non-
Indians are not subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction.  Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.  However, the protections of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act expressly extend to “persons,” not “American Indians.”  See Indian Civil Rights Act, 
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1302 (2006). 
 38 Christina D. Ferguson, Comment, Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modern Day Lesson on Tribal 
Sovereignty, 46 ARK. L. REV. 275, 287 (1993) (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-841, at 6 (1967)).  However, the ICRA 
provides fewer and more limited rights than the Constitution.  Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 (observing that the ICRA 
“provides some statutory guarantees of fair procedure, but these guarantees are not equivalent to their 
constitutional counterparts”). 
 39 Deer, supra note 13, at 128. 
 40 See Deer, supra note 21, at 460 (“The practical impact of the Major Crimes Act . . . is that fewer tribes 
pursue prosecution of crimes such as murder and rape. . . .  [Such] cases have become the domain of the 
federal government.”). 
 41 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319–20, 323 (1978). 
 42 Id. 
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past fifty years have established that a tribe’s status as a dependent sovereign 
limits its sovereignty and prevents it from prosecuting or incarcerating non-
Indians.43 
In 1978, the Supreme Court held that as dependent sovereigns, tribes 
cannot try and convict non-tribe members.44  In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, tribal authorities charged Mark David Oliphant, a non-Indian resident of 
the Port Madison Reservation, with “assaulting a tribal officer and resisting 
arrest.”45  Oliphant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that because he 
was a non-Indian, the Suquamish Indian Provisional Court did not have 
criminal jurisdiction over him.46  The Supreme Court agreed.47 
The Court found that tribes never expressly relinquished the power to 
impose criminal penalties on non-Indians.48  However, “unspoken 
assumption[s]”49 and “impli[cations]”50 in U.S.–Indian treaties show that 
Indians lost this power.51  The Court interpreted early treaties to find that tribes 
lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians unless Congress or a treaty 
provides for it.52  The Court reasoned that the federal government has long 
regarded the intrusion of a tribe’s authority into the lives and liberties of non-
 
 43 Id. at 323. 
 44 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 45 Id. at 194. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 195. 
 48 Id. at 204. 
 49 Id. at 203. 
 50 Id. at 208. 
 51 For some critiques of the Court’s analysis, see Barsh & Henderson, supra note 15, at 617 (stating that 
Oliphant represents “gestalt jurisprudence, conjecturing at length about long-dead individuals’ unexpressed 
motivations, passions, and beliefs and exalting this speculation to the status of written law”); Allison M. 
Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme 
Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 27 (1993) (arguing that Justice Rehnquist “rel[ies] on a 
questionable analysis of history and of Indian treaties with the United States”); Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Tribe: The Whole Is Greater Than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391 (1993) (describing 
the Oliphant decision as “reprehensible,” and arguing that it “laid the groundwork for the abrogation of tribal 
sovereignty”); Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and Its Discontents: An Essay Introducing the Case for Reargument 
Before the American Indian Nations Supreme Court, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (2003) (calling 
Oliphant an “embarrassment” to the nation’s highest court); and Geoffrey C. Heisey, Comment, Oliphant and 
Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: Asserting Congress’s Plenary Power to Restore Territorial 
Jurisdiction, 73 IND. L.J. 1051 (1998) (analyzing the Court’s theories of “unspoken assumption” and “implicit-
loss”). 
 52 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197 n.8 (citing treaties with various Indian tribes). 
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Indians as unwarranted and undesirable.53  The Court explained that Indian 
sovereignty to determine “external” relations is “necessarily inconsistent” with 
the status of tribes as dependent sovereigns.54  As “external” relations are those 
that involve nonmembers of the tribe,55 tribal law enforcement has no 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, even if they live in Indian Country.56 
In Duro v. Reina, the Court extended the analysis from Oliphant to find 
that tribal governments lack criminal jurisdiction over all nonmembers, 
whether Indian or not.57  The Court recognized that nonmember Indians and 
non-Indians both lack representation in tribal governments and thus are, at 
least theoretically, equally vulnerable to discrimination.58  The Court further 
reasoned that individuals’ right to liberty outweighs the interest of tribal 
sovereignty.59  Congress quickly reacted to Duro by amending the ICRA60 to 
restore “inherent” tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.61 
The amendment’s recognition of inherent jurisdiction was challenged 
fourteen years later in United States v. Lara.62  Lara, an American Indian who 
had been tried by a tribal court as a nonmember, challenged a subsequent 
federal prosecution for the same crime.63  The Court considered whether this 
second federal prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause64 and held that 
in permitting tribes to prosecute certain crimes, Congress did not simply 
delegate federal prosecutorial power but rather restored inherent tribal power.65  
Because the federal government and tribes acted as separate sovereigns when 
 
 53 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 687–88 (1990) (recognizing that there are “broader retained tribal powers 
outside the criminal context” but that “[t]he exercise of criminal jurisdiction . . . involves a far more direct 
intrusion on personal liberties”). 
 54 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). 
 55 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 686 (finding “implicit divestiture” of sovereignty when its exercise involves 
“the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe” (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 685. 
 58 Id. at 693 (“We hesitate to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out another group of 
citizens . . . for trial by political bodies that do not include them.”). 
 59 See id. 
 60 Jones, supra note 25, at 245. 
 61 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006). 
 62 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 63 Id. at 193 (syllabus). 
 64 Id. at 198. 
 65 Id. 
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prosecuting Lara, the Court concluded that the second prosecution did not 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.66 
In Lara, the Court also implicitly upheld congressional authority to dictate 
Indian sovereignty.67  Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence that 
congressional action in expanding tribal jurisdiction is appropriate because 
tribal governments were once independent sovereigns.68  If Congress can allow 
the states—entities that rely entirely on the federal government’s recognition—
inherent power,69 then it can do the same for tribes.70  Therefore, Justice 
Stevens concluded, the 1990 amendment to the ICRA was a constitutional 
exercise of congressional authority.71 
C. The States: Public Law 280 
For many years, the laws governing criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country 
were relatively uniform across reservations.  Before Oliphant, tribal 
governments alone dealt with “less serious crimes,”72 and only the federal 
government supplemented tribal law enforcement.73  This division of authority 
changed in 1953, when Congress passed PL 280, divesting federal power to a 
specific list of states (“PL 280 states”) that would henceforth have jurisdiction 
over crimes committed in Indian Country.74 
Public Law 280 states may enforce their criminal codes in Indian Country 
within state borders as if it were state territory.75  Definitions of which laws are 
“criminal,” and thus enforceable in Indian Country under PL 280, and which 
ones are “regulatory,” and thus unenforceable by states,76 vary from court to 
court.77  As passed in 1953, PL 280 did not require tribal or state consent to 
invoke jurisdiction and the law lacked an accountability mechanism.  
 
 66 Id. at 210. 
 67 Id. at 207. 
 68 Id. at 210 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 69 Id. at 211. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century?  Some 
Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 700 (2006). 
 73 Id. at 699. 
 74 Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) and 25 U.S.C. § 1321 
(2006)). 
 75 Id. 
 76 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
 77 See, e.g., id.; Confederated Tribes v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146, 149 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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Consequently, PL 280 has not “improv[ed] law and order in Indian country.”78  
Instead, it “has contributed to current problems of lawlessness by creating both 
jurisdictional vacuums and abuses of authority.”79  Congressional hearings, 
government reports, and tribal organization surveys suggest that state and local 
law enforcement, criminal justice officials, and even tribe members are highly 
dissatisfied with PL 280.80 
D. The Effect of Jurisdictional Laws on Law Enforcement in Indian Country 
Taken together, the MCA, ICRA, PL 280, and Supreme Court cases 
determining tribal jurisdiction have allowed for serious threats to American 
Indian women.  American Indian victims of sexual assault are less likely than 
non-Indian victims to receive health and legal services or to see their attackers 
prosecuted.  American Indian women are thus vulnerable to attacks by 
outsiders who know that enforcement barriers make it unlikely they will ever 
be punished.  While state and federal governments have the legal authority to 
combat sexual violence in Indian Country, complications inherent in policing 
external jurisdictions make enforcement much too difficult. 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has attempted to increase federal 
presence and responsiveness in Indian Country.81  These attempts include a 
pilot project to tackle violent crimes in Indian Country with a specific 
emphasis on sexual assaults on reservations.82  Recent congressional policy 
reflects a similar desire to respond to rape in Indian Country.83  A bill 
introduced in the 110th Congress, The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008,84 
 
 78 Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 
47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1706 (1998).  Adding to the confusion, some commentators interpret federal law as 
preempting state criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians.  Talib Ellison, 
Surviving Racism and Sexual Assault: American Indian Women Left Unprotected, MOD. AM. (Am. Univ. 
Wash. Coll. of Law, Wash., D.C.), Fall 2005, at 21, 22. 
 79 Arthur F. Foerster, Comment, Divisiveness and Delusion: Public Law 280 and the Evasive 
Criminal/Regulatory Distinction, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1355–56 (1999). 
 80 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 72, at 699; see also Issues of Concern to Southern California 
Tribes: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong. 122 (1989); Indian Law Enforcement 
Improvement Act of 1975: Hearing on S. 2010 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Comm. on 
Interior & Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. (1975). 
 81 A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 69. 
 82 All Things Considered: Rape Cases on Indian Lands Go Uninvestigated (National Public Radio 
broadcast July 25, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
12203114). 
 83 Deer, supra note 13, at 125–26. 
 84 H.R. 6583, 110th Cong. (2008). 
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would increase resources to combat rape in Indian Country while maintaining 
the federal government’s prosecutorial power.85 
Unfortunately, more resources alone cannot solve the problems federal and 
state officials face when searching for evidence or witnesses.  Funding cannot 
change a prosecutorial culture that views Indian reservation crimes as 
unimportant or unworthy of federal resources.86  Jurisdictional laws prevent 
tribal governments from promoting public safety in Indian Country87 and 
create insurmountable barriers to law enforcement and other services, thereby 
exacerbating crime against American Indians.88  Many victims do not know 
whether to call 911, the sheriff’s department, or local tribal law enforcement to 
report a crime.89  Confusion over jurisdiction may lead police and courts to 
ignore crimes even when they actually have exclusive jurisdiction.90  This 
combination of problems robs all American Indians of effective protection 
against violence, but it is especially problematic for American Indian women, 
who suffer sexual violence at alarming rates.  The current system, which 
“limits local tribal control, and forces reliance on the Federal  
Government . . . . is broken.”91 
1. Sexual Violence in Indian Country Remains Rampant 
Statistics show that despite efforts by federal and state law enforcement, 
American Indian women are one of the most vulnerable groups in the United 
States.  They are two-and-a-half times more likely to be victims of sexual 
violence than non-Indian women.92  Up to three-fourths of American Indian 
 
 85 Id. §§ 601–05. 
 86 See BONNIE MATHEWS, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES: A CONTINUING QUEST 
FOR SURVIVAL 154 (1981); Dussias, supra note 51, at 39. 
 87 Christopher B. Chaney, The Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Decisions During the Last 
Quarter of the Nineteenth Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 173, 180 (2000). 
 88 Law Enforcement in Indian Country, Hearing Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 21 
(2007) (statement of Bonnie Clairmont, Victim Advocacy Program Specialist, Tribal Law and Policy 
Institute). 
 89 Darryl Fears & Kari Lydersen, Native American Women Face High Rape Rate, Report Says; Tribes 
Often Lack Funds and Policing to Patrol Lands, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2007, at A14. 
 90 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 72, at 699. 
 91 Examining Federal Declinations to Prosecute Crimes in Indian Country, Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Declinations] (statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan). 
 92 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION AND RACE, 1993–98 
(2001) [hereinafter VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION]; PERRY, supra note 18, at 5.  For example, five per one thousand 
American Indians age twelve or older are subject to rape or sexual assault compared to two per one thousand 
in the general population.  Id. 
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women are victims of some form of sexual assault,93 and one-third are victims 
of rape.94  Although these numbers are staggering, American Indians, 
researchers, and providers of health and other support services say that sexual 
assault in Indian country is actually even higher.95 
Most rapes against American Indian women are perpetrated by non-Indian 
men,96 and most of these assailants are white.97  One study found that “[n]early 
4 in 5 American Indian victims of rape/sexual violence described the offender 
as white.”98  In addition, American Indians are more likely to be victims of 
sexual violence and assaults committed by a stranger or mere acquaintance,99 
whereas women in the general population are more likely to be victimized by a 
current or former husband, cohabiting partner, boyfriend, or date.100 
2. Enforcement Is Sporadic and Ineffective 
The geographic distance between non-tribal law enforcement and Indian 
Country,101 as well as a lack of collaboration, communication, and clear lines 
of authority between tribal and non-tribal authorities, lead to an enforcement 
vacuum.102  Tribal officials complain that state law enforcement officials 
respond slowly and sometimes not at all to crimes of sexual violence.103  In 
these cases, tribal authorities cannot step in to close the gap,104 thereby 
 
 93 NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., SEXUAL ASSAULT IN INDIAN COUNTRY: CONFRONTING SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 1 (2000) (citing NANCY HAWKINS ET AL., MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVICES, AMERICAN INDIAN 
WOMEN’S CHEMICAL HEALTH PROJECT (1993)). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 1. 
 96 PERRY, supra note 18, at 9. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at v.  In 41% of sexual assaults, American Indian victims described the offender as a stranger.  Id. 
at 8. 
 100 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 3, at 61.  Seventy-six percent of women in the general population 
who reported being raped and/or physically assaulted “were victimized by a current or former husband, 
cohabiting partner, boyfriend, or date.”  Id. 
 101 See A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 69; Holcomb, supra note 14, at 767; Kevin K. Washburn, 
American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 711 (2006). 
 102 See Law Enforcement in Indian Country, supra note 88, at 21 (statement of Bonnie Clairmont, Victim 
Advocacy Program Specialist, Tribal Law and Policy Institute) (describing the lack of resources and 
enforcement problems that affect Indian women who have been sexually assaulted). 
 103 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 72, at 698. 
 104 Sumayyah Waheed, Domestic Violence on the Reservation: Imperfect Laws, Imperfect Solution, 19 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 287, 293 (2004). 
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enabling non-Indian perpetrators of violent crimes to go unpunished.105  
Furthermore, distance reduces any deterrent effect.106  The simple perception 
that a state will not exercise its authority is enough to encourage crime in 
Indian Country.107 
Confusion over who has jurisdiction would remain despite increased 
funding.  The time required to determine which government should respond to 
a particular crime scene makes an accessible, timely, and effective legal 
response impossible.108  A victim may err when choosing between 911, the 
sheriff’s department, or local tribal law enforcement, in which case her call 
will be rejected by the agency with instructions to call another.109  As 
jurisdictional uncertainties delay or stall crime reporting and subsequent 
investigations, women are vulnerable to continued assault by those seeking to 
deter reporting or prevent a successful prosecution.110  In a typical case, an 
American Indian woman may call law enforcement after being attacked, only 
to find that no one will respond.111 
Moreover, Indian Health Services (IHS) has been unable or unwilling to 
develop appropriate responses to sexual violence.112  The nearest IHS facility 
for some victims may be up to one hundred miles away,113 and IHS staff 
members generally do not know how to gather and preserve evidence of a 
crime.114  Victims are often turned away or referred elsewhere because their 
IHS facility lacks a rape kit or employees trained to administer the health 
exam.115  The IHS only recently began allocating funding to train employees 
on forensic examinations for sexual assaults.116  Official IHS policy is that it 
 
 105 Mending the Sacred Hoop, Jurisdictional Issues Complicate Response to Sexual Assault for Tribes 
Under PL 280 Status, RESOURCE (Nat’l Sexual Violence Res. Ctr., Enola, Pa.), Fall/Winter 2003, at 12. 
 106 See Heisey, supra note 51, at 1054. 
 107 A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 76.  In Alaska, for example, one-third of the 226 Native Alaskan 
villages have no law enforcement, “rendering them virtually defenseless to lawbreakers.”  Id. (quoting Alaska 
Advisory Comm., Racism’s Frontier: The Untold Story of Discrimination and Division in Alaska, Apr. 2002, 
at 39) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 108 NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., supra note 93, at 4, 6; Mending the Sacred Hoop, supra note 
105, at 12. 
 109 Fears & Lydersen, supra note 89, at A14. 
 110 Mending the Sacred Hoop, supra note 105, at 2, 12. 
 111 Law Enforcement in Indian Country, supra note 88, at 21. 
 112 Mending the Sacred Hoop, supra note 105, at 2, 12. 
 113 Law Enforcement in Indian Country, supra note 88, at 21. 
 114 Fears & Lydersen, supra note 89, at A14; see also Deer, supra note 21, at 462–63 (“[T]he federal 
government spends more per capita for health care in federal prisons than for health care on reservations.”). 
 115 Law Enforcement in Indian Country, supra note 88, at 21. 
 116 Deer, supra note 13, at 126. 
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cannot establish the commission or absence of a crime, and therefore it 
performs “only medically related care and treatment.”117  Even so, many 
facilities do not provide the contraception and sexually transmitted disease 
treatment that is standard medical care for rape victims.118 
When American Indian women report rapes, investigators often mishandle 
these cases.  Police in Indian Country frequently treat victims as though they 
are not telling the truth.119  Horror stories of victim blaming foster distrust of 
nontribal law enforcement.120  Untrained law enforcement personnel may 
question victims inappropriately, leaving victims feeling responsible for the 
crime.121  And confusion over jurisdiction allows police to ignore crimes of 
abuse against Indian women.122  When state law enforcement officers respond 
to Indian Country crimes, a lack of respect and cultural sensitivity can lead to 
abuses of authority.123 
Finally, federal124 and state125 governments suffer from a bad reputation in 
Indian Country, making it difficult for them to investigate crimes and find 
witnesses.  The relationship with Indian Country residents is an extension of 
the past two centuries of federal–tribal relations, during which the federal 
government has been responsible for many atrocities.126  Residents are 
understandably skeptical of increased federal involvement127 and often are 
reluctant to approach federal authorities.128 
 
 117 Indian Health Manual, Ch. 13, § 13.8(F)(3)(a)(2) (1992), available at http://www.ihs.gov/publicinfo/ 
publications/IHSmanual/Part3/pt3chapt13/pt3chpt13.htm (“Rape is a crime, and medical examination cannot 
conclusively establish the presence or absence of the commission of a crime.  It is IHS policy to perform only 
medically related care and treatment.”). 
 118 Law Enforcement in Indian Country, supra note 88, at 21. 
 119 AMNESTY INT’L USA, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 58–59 (2006). 
 120 Law Enforcement in Indian Country, supra note 88, at 22. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Mending the Sacred Hoop, supra note 105, at 12. 
 123 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 72, at 699. 
 124 Washburn, supra note 101, at 735–38. 
 125 See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 15, at 633 n.127.  In 2000, nearly 1.6 million of those who 
identified themselves as solely American Indian lived in ten states: California, Oklahoma, Arizona, New 
Mexico, Texas, North Carolina, Alaska, Washington, New York, and Michigan.  PERRY, supra note 18, at 3.  
Of these states, only California and Alaska were mandatory PL 280 states.  Pub. L. No. 83-280 (1953) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) and 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006)).  Alaska is the state with the highest 
proportion of its population, 16%–19%, identifying as American Indian.  PERRY, supra note 18, at 3. 
 126 Washburn, supra note 101, at 735–36. 
 127 Id. 
 128 A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 69; NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., supra note 93, at 8. 
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Public Law 280 exacerbated the already negative relations between states 
and tribes.129  State criminal jurisdiction exposes tribe members to hostile state 
institutions130 because state law enforcement is not accountable to tribal 
communities.131  Because Indians are usually a minority in their county 
electorates, they generally lack the political influence to remove racist sheriffs, 
district attorneys, or judges.132  In addition, the same practical barriers to 
effective federal law enforcement prevent effective state law enforcement.  
Thus, resolving jurisdictional conflicts in favor of increased state enforcement 
will not reduce crime in Indian Country. 
State law enforcement personnel frequently lack the cultural knowledge to 
deal with American Indian issues133 and are often unaware of reservation 
residents’ discontent.134  Tribal authorities sometimes fear that state authorities 
will harass tribe members rather than protect American Indian victims.135  
Excessive force and unwarranted arrests do not reduce crime; instead they do 
much to damage relations between community members and the police.136 
The most resounding evidence that state law enforcement in Indian Country 
fails is the retrocession of state jurisdiction to the federal government.  In 1968, 
Congress amended PL 280 to allow any state to relinquish its jurisdiction over 
Indian Country.137  Since then, seven states have retroceded their authority to 
the federal government.138  The amendment also requires that any future 
assertion of state jurisdiction include a vote of consent from the affected 
tribes.139  Not a single tribe has consented to state jurisdiction since that 
time.140  This suggests that when it comes to combating crime in Indian 
 
 129 Washburn, supra note 101, at 775–76 (“Given that the federal system was justified by the notion that 
local state citizens were the tribe’s “deadliest enemies,” we might see serious pushback and concern by tribes 
in response to a proposal to turn criminal authority over to the states.”). 
 130 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 72, at 700. 
 131 Id. at 719. 
 132 Id. at 703. 
 133 Id. at 699. 
 134 Id. at 719. 
 135 Id. at 714. 
 136 Id. at 717. 
 137 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (2006). 
 138 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 72, at 707 n.62.  Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin—
all of which are mandatory states—have undertaken retrocession.  Of the optional states, Nevada, Montana, 
and Washington have retroceded at least some of their jurisdiction.  Id. 
 139 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006). 
 140 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 72, at 704. 
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Country, expanding state criminal jurisdiction should be the last option 
considered.141 
3. More Prosecutions Are Needed 
Many Indian women do not report sexual assaults because such cases are 
rarely prosecuted.142  A lack of data makes it difficult to assess the extent of 
federal investigation and prosecution of these crimes in Indian Country.  The 
DOJ recently refused a request from Congress to provide specific declination 
rates in Indian Country,143 but commentators have reported that federal 
prosecutors decline the vast majority of Indian Country rape cases.144 
A Syracuse University project suggests the current declination rate for 
cases of murder and manslaughter is 50%, compared to a 76% declination rate 
for adult sex crimes.145  Moreover, most federal sexual abuse convictions that 
do occur tend to involve child victims rather than adult women.146  One DOJ 
official testified that the vast majority of declinations were made simply 
“because there was no federal crime.”147  This alone cannot explain the 76% 
declination rate for sexual assault crimes, since under the MCA sexual assault 
in Indian Country is always a federal crime. 
One reason for high declination rates may be the geographic distance 
between courts, federal prosecutors, and Indian Country—the majority of 
Indian Country crimes occur in isolated rural areas.148  The distance also deters 
Indian Country residents from approaching federal authorities.  Residents’ 
difficulty in traveling is exacerbated by the fact that many live below the 
 
 141 Id. at 724. 
 142 Law Enforcement in Indian Country, supra note 88, at 22. 
 143 Declinations, supra note 91, at 2 (statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan).  The DOJ’s witness cited 
confidentiality concerns, public safety issues, and the safety of witnesses or victims as the reasons for refusing 
to provide declination rates.  Id. at 19 (statement of Drew H. Wrigley, U.S. Attorney for the District of North 
Dakota). 
 144 Andrea Smith, Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide, in REMEMBERING CONQUEST: 
FEMINIST/WOMANIST PERSPECTIVES ON RELIGION, COLONIZATION, AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 31, 46 (Nantawan 
Boonprasat Lewis & Marie M. Fortune eds., 1999). 
 145 Declinations, supra note 91, at 3 (statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan). 
 146 Deer, supra note 13, at 125–26. 
 147 Declinations, supra note 91, at 22–23 (statement of Drew H. Wrigley, U.S. Attorney for the District of 
North Dakota). 
 148 Washburn, supra note 101, at 719; Nicholas Hentoff, The Natives Are Arrestless, WASH. MONTHLY, 
Dec. 1990, at 20, 23. 
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poverty line.149  And even when cases are brought to trial, American Indian 
victims and witnesses often lack the transportation and resources to participate 
or attend.150 
Long distances and poor federal–community relations make it undesirable 
for federal prosecutors to pursue Indian Country cases.  Thus, increasing the 
resources devoted to Indian Country crimes may not increase prosecution rates.  
According to federal prosecutors, they lack DOJ support in pursuing Indian 
Country crimes because DOJ officials believe that such investigations require 
too much time for such a small population.151  Officials do not appreciate the 
magnitude of crime in Indian Country and do not understand the fact that it is a 
federal responsibility to police and prosecute such crime.152  This work culture 
means those taking on Indian Country cases generally are new attorneys who 
do not choose their assignments, but who will choose other types of cases as 
soon as they can.153 
4. Concluding Thoughts 
State and federal agencies have a history of failing to prosecute crimes of 
sexual violence,154 especially when the perpetrator is non-Indian.155  This leads 
offenders to believe that even after an arrest, the chance of being prosecuted is 
low and the punishment minimal.156  Alarmingly low arrest and prosecution 
rates send the message that there are few consequences for attacking American 
Indian women.  And in fact, advocates have said that offenders publicly brag 
about their exploits and blame the victims.157  With few prospects of 
improvement under the current system, a new solution is necessary. 
Tribal governments have no recourse against underperforming federal or 
state authorities.  While Cherokee Nation v. Georgia indicated that tribes “look 
 
 149 U.S. Census Bureau, WE THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA NATIVES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 12 (2006) (“The ratio of American Indians and Alaska Natives living below the official poverty level 
in 1999 to that of all people was more than 2.”); NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., supra note 93, at 3 
(“[M]ost Native Americans live in a state of poverty, with 40% in rural settings.”).  
 150 Washburn, supra note 101, at 711.  The distance prevents witnesses from testifying at trial or at 
probation and parole hearings.  Mending the Sacred Hoop, supra note 105, at 13. 
 151 Declinations, supra note 91, at 17 (statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan). 
 152 All Things Considered, supra note 82. 
 153 Washburn, supra note 101, at 719. 
 154 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 119, at 61–74. 
 155 Law Enforcement in Indian Country, supra note 88, at 22. 
 156 NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., supra note 93, at 6. 
 157 Law Enforcement in Indian Country, supra note 88, at 21. 
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to [the federal] government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its 
power; [and] appeal to it for relief of their wants,” the Court has never 
recognized that the federal government is legally required to provide these 
benefits.158  Only in cases where an enforceable treaty exists is the federal 
government required to provide law enforcement for a tribe.159  Furthermore, 
few statutes require funding for the myriad programs that are supposed to help 
Indian Country residents.160  Despite increases in DOJ funding between 1998 
and 2003,161 there is now a downward trend in funding to aid law enforcement 
in Indian Country.162 
II. PROPOSAL 
Federal and state law enforcement have not and cannot adequately combat 
crime in Indian Country.  Thus, Congress should amend the Indian Civil 
Rights Act and return to the tribes their inherent sovereign power163 to try all 
crimes and convict non-Indians. 
In other contexts, Congress has countermanded Supreme Court decisions 
by passing ameliorative legislation.164  This has already proven to be a 
successful strategy in the area of tribal criminal jurisdiction.165  When the 
Supreme Court held in Duro that tribes had no jurisdiction over nonmember 
 
 158 Holcomb, supra note 14, at 765 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 159 Id. at 766; A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 67. 
 160 A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 79.  For example, the federal government proposed a sexual assault 
nurse examiners program that was never funded.  Id. at 72. 
 161 Id. at 70 (discussing how department expenditures on Indian Country programs increased by 86.7% 
between 1998 and 2003). 
 162 Id. at 70–79. 
 163 For an analysis explaining why Congress can restore inherent sovereignty rather than simply delegate 
federal power, see Samuel E. Ennis, Comment, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction over 
Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553 (2009). 
 164 See, e.g., Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc5 (2006) 
(passed in response to City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), in which the Court held that Congress 
overstepped its power of enforcement); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (rejecting the narrow Supreme Court definition of 
“disability” and thus endeavoring to protect more people from discrimination); The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb4 (2006) (reinstating strict scrutiny review for government 
actions that indirectly limit individuals’ exercise of religion).  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was 
passed in response to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990), where two American Indians were fired and denied employment benefits after testing positive for 
mescaline, a drug contained in the peyote cactus they used in a religious ceremony. 
 165 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004). 
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Indians, Congress reacted by amending the ICRA166 and extending inherent 
tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.167  A similar statute could 
“overturn” Oliphant and extend jurisdiction over non-Indians.  Additionally, 
Congress should address statutory sentencing limits and ambiguous provisions 
that suggest crime-specific tribal jurisdiction.  The most efficient way to 
accomplish these goals would be to further amend the ICRA.  Currently, the 
relevant portion of the statute reads as follows: 
“[P]owers of self-government” means and includes . . . the inherent 
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.168 
No Indian tribe . . . shall . . . inflict cruel and unusual punishments, 
and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty 
or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and 
[1] a fine of $5,000, or both.169 
Instead, an amended ICRA could provide: 
“[P]owers of self-government” means and includes . . . the inherent 
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over all persons and for any crime committed in 
Indian Country. 
No Indian tribe . . . shall . . . inflict cruel and unusual punishments. 
The remainder of this Comment address concerns about—and potential 
benefits of—this proposed amendment.  Part III presents and answers possible 
constitutional concerns.  Part IV contextualizes this proposal within the legal 
framework of Indian law and explains how such a legal change would help 
combat sexual violence. 
III.  TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS UNDER THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 
There are two central questions regarding the constitutionality of this 
proposal.  The first is whether Congress has the authority to enact such an 
amendment.  The second is whether the proposal runs afoul of the Due Process 
 
 166 Id. at 197–98. 
 167 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006).  Congress amended the ICRA to state that 
“‘powers of self-government’. . . means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 168 Id. (emphasis added). 
 169 Id. § 1302(7) (emphasis added). 
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Clause.  As to the first question, Congress has plenary power to determine 
Indian law,170 a power the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed.171  In Lara, 
the Court upheld Congress’s amendment of the ICRA in response to Duro, 
stating that the amendment concerned “a tribe’s authority to control events that 
occur upon the tribe’s own land.”172  If Congress were to pass the amendment 
suggested in Part II, extending jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders, it would 
simply be an enhancement of a tribe’s already existing authority to control 
events on its land.173 
As to concerns regarding the Due Process Clause, although this question 
requires a more in-depth analysis, the ultimate answer is that the proposal does 
not run afoul of the Constitution.  Tribal sovereignty and legal authority 
predate the Constitution, and thus tribes are not bound by the Constitution.174  
The ICRA has extended some of the Constitution’s due process limitations to 
tribal governments, but not all.175 
Notwithstanding the limited application of the Due Process Clause to 
tribes, federal legislation and tribal government safeguards are sufficiently 
robust to protect due process rights of defendants before tribal courts.  The 
ICRA provides these defendants with the right to file a habeas petition before a 
federal court.176  The original draft of the ICRA, which extended its guarantees 
only to “American Indians,” was amended to extend to “any person” before the 
tribal court.177 
The ICRA also states that “[n]o Indian tribe . . . shall . . . deny to any 
person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon 
request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.”178  The main difference 
between tribal juries and federal juries is that conviction by a tribal jury 
 
 170 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  See infra Part IV.A for an explanation of why Congress is the best actor. 
 171 See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998). 
 172 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 194 (2004). 
 173 The Court has identified at least one treaty which allowed for a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 199 (1978). 
 174 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194 n.3.  The federal government still influences the content of tribal 
constitutions, while doctrines of discovery, treaty-based cessions of authority, and explicit congressional 
abrogation also operate to constrain tribes.  Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. 
REV. 799, 819–21 (2007).  The ICRA also allows suits against tribal police in federal court.  U.S. COMM’N ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, AMERICAN INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS HANDBOOK 39–40 (1972) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS 
HANDBOOK]. 
 175 CIVIL RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 174, at 21. 
 176 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006). 
 177 Barsh & Henderson, supra note 15, at 631. 
 178 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10). 
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requires only a majority vote while federal juries must be unanimous.179  On 
the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that state criminal convictions by 
less than a unanimous jury do not violate the Sixth Amendment,180 so this 
difference should not pose an obstacle to tribal jurisdiction.181  More 
importantly, however, the ICRA does not require that the jury be “impartial.”  
Some may fear that this allows for race-based exclusions from jury 
participation.  However, tribal juries typically include local non-Indians, so 
there is little chance of racially segregated juries.182 
The major flaw of the ICRA is that it does not include the right to free 
counsel.183  Defendants have a right to counsel, but it is a right to employ 
counsel “at [their] own expense.”184  Despite this deficiency, Justice Rehnquist, 
who wrote for the majority in Oliphant, said that due to the enactment of the 
ICRA, any dangers of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants have 
largely disappeared.185  If defendants cannot afford an attorney, a tribal court 
will usually appoint one to represent them.186  Conversely, Indians’ right to 
counsel in non-tribal courts is practically illusory.  Most Indian Country 
defendants are indigent and thus are represented by a public defender who 
must overcome cultural hurdles, frequently needs an interpreter, and may not 
 
 179 CIVIL RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 174, at 36. 
 180 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972). 
 181 Civil Rights Handbook, supra note 174, at 36. 
 182 Barsh & Henderson, supra note 15, at 633 n.127.  In contrast, Indians are commonly underrepresented 
in non-tribal juries.  Washburn, supra note 101, at 747; see also CIVIL RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 174, at 
33.  For example, over one ten-year period, no Indians served on grand juries of Lake County, California, 
where Indians were more than four percent of the population.  Id.  These all-white juries often administered 
unjust results.  In a state proceeding against two men who raped, beat, and threw an American Indian woman 
off a bridge, jurors could not agree to convict.  Law Enforcement in Indian Country, supra note 88, at 30.  
When asked why, one juror replied: “She was just another drunk Indian.”  Id. 
 183 Another complication, if not a serious deficiency, is the effect adjudication in tribal court has had on 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the dangers of double jeopardy.  See Alex M. Hagan, Student 
Article, From Formal Separation to Functional Equivalence: Tribal–Federal Dual Sovereignty and the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel, 54 S.D. L. REV. 129 (2009).  The Eighth Circuit, for example, has held that in 
some circumstances a tribal court proceeding may trigger a defendant’s federal right to counsel even before he 
or she is charged formally in federal court.  United States v. Red Bird, 287 F.3d 709, 714–16 (8th Cir. 2002).  
This process takes into consideration the nature, importance, and identity of a particular tribal process and the 
individual’s due process rights.  Hagan, supra note 183, at 133. 
 184 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (2006).  This is mirrored in many tribal constitutions.  
See, e.g., The Chippewa Cree Tribe Law and Order Code, tit. 3, ch. 6 (1987) (“You have the right to an 
attorney at your own expense, or to have lay counsel or someone else with you.”). 
 185 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
 186 CIVIL RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 174, at 42. 
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have the resources needed to conduct thorough investigations in Indian 
Country.187 
Also, in interstate and international contexts, a foreigner without local 
representation is still generally subject to a sovereign’s criminal jurisdiction.  
This Comment anticipates a similar situation for non-Indians in Indian 
Country.188  The majority in Lara implicitly upheld tribal jurisdiction over 
Indians from a different tribe.189  In truth, the constitutionality of the extension 
of jurisdiction over nonmember Indians has never been challenged.190  
Regardless, the intuitive response is that if the Court allows Indian defendants 
who are U.S. citizens to be tried by tribal courts, a true commitment to civil 
rights requires that non-Indian defendants face tribal courts as well.191 
Tribal governments are the primary institutions for maintaining order in 
Indian Country.192  Tribal courts and law enforcement play a particularly vital 
role in developing a strong tribal government.193  The powers to arrest, 
 
 187 Washburn, supra note 101, at 721–22. 
 188 The Supreme Court has explicitly refused to address whether due process rights preempt tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.  United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 194 (2004).  It should also be asked 
whether insisting on constitutional methods of preserving individual rights ignores the fact that tribal 
institutions and societies have equally valid, if different, ways of protecting the individual.  See generally 
Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591 (2009) (exploring how 
racism against American Indians tends to focus on constructing tribal societies as inferior groups in order to 
access valuable Native American natural resources).  This perspective is bolstered by the fact that the ICRA 
was intended to “protect” American Indians from their own tribal governments but has instead contributed to 
the breakdown of law and order in Indian Country.  See generally supra Part I. 
 189 Because the ICRA does not include all the safeguards found in the Bill of Rights, the question remains 
whether the Constitution bars tribal courts from prosecuting and punishing Indian U.S. citizens.  Concurring in 
Lara, Justice Kennedy wrote that the relaxation of constitutional rights for tribe members before their tribal 
governments “is a historical exception . . . to the limited extent that a member of a tribe consents to be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of his own tribe.”  541 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  He criticized the 
majority in Lara because, by extending tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, the Court subjected U.S. 
citizens to extra-constitutional sovereigns within national borders.  Id. 
 190 Most Supreme Court jurisprudence on the matter involves federal prosecutions subsequent to tribal 
ones.  To challenge the constitutionality of tribal jurisdiction, a defendant would have to submit a writ of 
habeas corpus against the tribal proceeding before she found herself in a federal prosecution.  Id. at 214 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The proper occasion to test the legitimacy of the Tribe’s authority . . . was in the 
first, tribal proceeding.”).  The ICRA vests district courts with jurisdiction over these claims.  25 U.S.C. 
§ 1303 (2006).  For a defense of legality in the event of such a challenge, see Benjamin J. Cordiano, Note, 
Unspoken Assumptions: Examining Tribal Jurisdiction over Nonmembers Nearly Two Decades After Duro v. 
Reina, 41 CONN. L. REV. 265 (2008). 
 191 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 708 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing concerns over 
discrimination in tribal courts). 
 192 A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 76. 
 193 Id.  For example, by resolving civil disputes, tribal courts foster tribal economic development and self-
sufficiency.  Id. at 78. 
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prosecute, incarcerate, exile, and exclude are important powers that tribal 
nations possess as sovereign entities.194  Given the prevalence of crime in 
Indian Country, some argue that maintaining order is more important than 
focusing on whether individuals’ political representation sufficiently protects 
their due process rights.195  Applying this reasoning, Congress should revitalize 
tribal sovereignty and amend the ICRA to favor Indian self-determination. 
IV.  THE BENEFITS OF RESTORING TRIBAL JURISDICTION 
This Comment’s proposal would impact both the law and its enforcement 
in Indian Country.  First, congressional extension of inherent tribal jurisdiction 
over all people who commit crimes in Indian Country provides a statutory 
basis for a territory-based theory of tribal sovereignty.  Second, basing criminal 
codes on territorial jurisdiction rather than tribal membership leads to better 
criminal codes.  These benefits are unachievable without holistic change.  A 
slower and less radical change,196 though perhaps easier to implement, would 
suffer from the underlying problem of uncertain legal grounding. 
Enforcement benefits of this proposal include more sovereignty for tribal 
governments and better enforcement of laws in general.  To be effective, law 
enforcement policies in Indian Country must restore tribal sovereignty.  The 
Court has implicitly recognized the importance of tribal law enforcement197 in 
preserving American Indian culture.198  The harshest erosion of tribal 
 
 194 Riley, supra note 174, at 835; cf. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal 
Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 479 (2005) (highlighting the differences between tribes as sovereign 
entities and private associations). 
 195 Michael C. Blumm & Michael Cadigan, The Indian Court of Appeals: A Modest Proposal to Eliminate 
Supreme Court Jurisdiction over Indian Cases, 46 ARK. L. REV. 203, 217–18 (1993). 
 196 See, e.g., Marie Quasius, Note, Native American Rape Victims: Desperately Seeking an Oliphant-Fix, 
93 MINN. L. REV. 1902, 1906–07 (2009) (advocating for an opt-in program under which the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs would “evaluate the ability of tribal governments to assume criminal jurisdiction over sexual assault 
and other major crimes and then facilitate the assumption of jurisdiction”).  Quasius also advocates funding 
public defenders to work in tribal courts and funding qualified tribes to help assume jurisdiction.  Id. at 1925.  
While better than the status quo, this solution relies on the BIA and thus is unlikely to avoid the inherent 
difficulties that plague federal–tribal relations.  See supra Part I.D.  Also, this Comment contends that 
subjecting non-Indians to tribal courts could spur the federal government to fund tribal institutions.  If tribes 
must secure BIA funding before assuming jurisdiction, it is quite likely that such jurisdiction will never be 
granted. 
 197 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (“The retained sovereignty of the tribe [through criminal 
trials] is but a recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be 
tribal members.”); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331–32 (1978) (noting that tribes have a 
“significant interest in . . . preserving tribal customs and traditions”). 
 198 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n.17 (1987) (discussing 
Indians' exemption from certain state laws, like taxation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) 
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sovereignty has occurred in the criminal law context,199 with disastrous 
consequences for American Indians.  Hampering the tribal response to crime 
endangers a tribe’s members and robs tribal governments of a core aspect of 
their sovereignty.  “Public safety is fundamental to the preservation of 
communities,”200 and because Indian communities lack it, many American 
Indians have lost faith in the criminal justice system.201  Returning tribal 
jurisdiction over all who enter Indian land will greatly benefit the law 
enforcement response in Indian Country. 
A strong tribal law enforcement response is particularly important for 
victims of sexual violence.  The most effective programs for healing revive 
indigenous spirituality, culture, and sovereignty.202  Such programs are 
unlikely to develop without enhanced tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction.  This 
Comment’s proposal would both increase the frequency of law enforcement 
response and improve the quality of that response, thereby better helping 
victims of sexual violence and, ultimately, all American Indians. 
A. Legal Benefits 
Congress is the appropriate actor to allocate jurisdiction among state, 
federal, and tribal governments.  For the past fifty years, Congress and the 
Executive Branch have used an Indian self-determination model as the 
framework for American Indian policy.203  In contrast, the Court assumes an 
 
(“A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee 
lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”); see also Foerster, supra note 79, at 1354 (discussing 
the importance of tribal self-governance). 
 199 Dussias, supra note 51, at 37. 
 200 A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 79. 
 201 Id. at 68. 
 202 Smith, supra note 144, at 41.  For examples of successful tribe-oriented responses to social and legal 
problems, see LEEANNA ARROWCHIS & VALERIE SENECA, NAT’L AM. INDIAN HOUS. COUNCIL, SIX CASE 
STUDIES: TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION UTILIZING NAHASDA ACTIVITIES (2002).  The White Mountain 
Apache tribe had a higher success rate with their housing project than any other in the last few decades.  Id. at 
18.  The Menominee Tribe implemented a successful drug rehabilitation program that was culturally structured 
and implemented.  Id. at 31–32.  Since implementing this program, the tribal crime index has decreased by 
17%.  Id. at 34.  In another example, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld a statute extending tribal jurisdiction to 
cases of child custody involving Indians, even outside the reservation.  John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 743–44 
(Alaska 1999). 
 203 See, e.g., The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996 (2006) (preserving Indian 
sacred sites and religious rights); Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-253, 43 Stat. 636 (1924) 
(providing for compensation of lands taken by white settlers); Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. 
No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049 (repealed 1978) (waiving sovereign immunity for Indian claims and creating a panel 
to adjudicate the complaints). 
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assimilation model of Indian law when deciding cases dealing with American 
Indian issues.204  The Court recently went so far as to undercut Congress’s 
power to affect Indian Country.205  Today, the Court is the principal actor 
eroding tribal sovereignty,206 making it unfit to lead the way in empowering 
tribal governments.207 
Instead, a federal statute is needed to establish a territory-based theory of 
tribal sovereignty.  Early Supreme Court precedent recognized tribal interests 
in maintaining authority over both land and people.208  Recent decisions, on the 
other hand, highlight the consent of tribe members as the primary basis for 
tribal sovereignty.209  Most disturbingly, the Court is moving toward making 
membership the only basis for tribal sovereignty.210  This Comment’s proposal 
addresses and revives tribal sovereignty as it is defined in early Court 
precedent: territory and membership.  The territorial basis for sovereignty is 
true to precedent and leads to better criminal codes. 
1. A Modern Definition of Sovereignty 
Justice Marshall laid the foundation for the common law jurisprudence of 
tribal sovereignty.211  In The Cherokee Cases, he introduced the term 
“domestic dependent nations” to protect tribal interests from aggressive state 
intrusions.212  Today, the Court uses the term to weaken tribal interests and 
authority. 
 
 204 Foerster, supra note 79, at 1338. 
 205 Frickey, supra note 194, at 452; David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New 
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996); L. Scott Gould, The Consent 
Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996). 
 206 Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian 
Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1999); see also Dussias, supra note 51, at 6. 
 207 For another defense of restoring inherent tribal sovereignty, see Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots 
Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the 
Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651 (2009). 
 208 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (discussing the sovereignty of Indian tribes); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831) (discussing American Indians’ “unquestionable . . . right to use the 
lands they occupy”). 
 209 See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); see also Dussias, supra note 51, at 4 
(discussing the Court’s shift); Foerster, supra note 79, at 1338 n.24 (summarizing academic literature on the 
Court’s shift). 
 210 Dussias, supra note 51, at 17. 
 211 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11 (“These wrongs are of a character wholly irremediable by the 
common law; and these complaints are wholly without remedy of any kind, except by the interposition of this 
honorable court.”); see also Worcester, 31 U.S. 515. 
 212 Dussias, supra note 51, at 3. 
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The Supreme Court seemingly has reduced its adherence to precedent in 
Indian cases.213  Precedent dictates that courts narrowly construe congressional 
acts with a presumption against decreasing tribal self-government,214 but they 
routinely allow state and federal interests to trump tribal sovereignty.215  In 
doing so, courts have stopped treating tribes as nations within a nation.216  But 
the Court has not uniformly applied this new approach.  The Court treats tribes 
as sovereigns when they would benefit from being treated as property owners 
and as private associations when they would benefit from being treated as 
sovereigns.217 
Membership is important as a basis for tribal sovereignty because it 
highlights the importance of preserving tribal culture.  But to have a robust 
basis for tribal sovereignty, the law must also recognize the sovereignty of 
tribal governments over tribal territory.218  In Worcester v. Georgia, Justice 
Marshall described Indian nations as “distinct political communities, having 
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive.”219  This is a 
clear endorsement of a territory-based rule barring state interference inside 
reservation borders.220 
Admittedly, Justice Marshall vacillated between the bases of membership 
and territory when discussing tribal sovereignty.  However, Justice Marshall’s 
words reflect the reality of his day: segregation meant that membership and 
territory could be conflated.  In the early years of tribal–U.S. relations, Indian 
Country was more segregated from the general U.S. population than it is 
 
 213 Blumm & Cadigan, supra note 195, at 208. 
 214 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552–54; Barsh & Henderson, supra note 15, at 613. 
 215 See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973) (evaluating the facts by 
weighing federal preemption rather than tribal sovereignty).  See generally Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. 
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (allowing states to prohibit Indian religious practices that conflict with 
the state’s interest in controlling drug abuse); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 
(1988) (allowing the federal government to destroy Indian sacred sites to build roads and harvest timber). 
 216 Blumm & Cadigan, supra note 195, at 203. 
 217 Id. at 205; Frickey, supra note 194, at 444; Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1, 55 (1991); see also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nations, 492 
U.S. 408 (1989) (holding tribes cannot zone fee lands nonmembers own); United States v. Sioux Nation of 
Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 416 (1980) (allowing the federal government to change the form of trust lands if it 
provides property of equal value in good faith); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 284–85 
(1955) (finding Indian land under aboriginal title is not protected by the Fifth Amendment). 
 218 Cf. Blumm & Cadigan, supra note 195, at 233.  Jurisdiction for the authors’ proposed Indian Court of 
Appeals would include cases in which a party is a member of a tribe, the dispute occurs in Indian Country, the 
dispute concerns Indian land, resources, property, or government, or the dispute concerns an Indian 
reservation.  Id. 
 219 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832). 
 220 Id. at 561. 
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now.221  Thus, when the Cherokee Cases were decided, segregation was 
assumed.  Even though Justice Marshall did not explicitly discuss the authority 
of Cherokees over non-Indians within their borders, to say that the Cherokee 
had power over their members was to say they had power over their land.222 
The modern Court began its erosion of the territory-based definition of 
sovereignty in Williams v. Lee.223  Since then, the Court has completely 
eliminated territory as a basis for sovereignty for the purposes of criminal 
law.224  In Duro, the Court discussed consent and political membership as the 
basis for tribal authority to the complete exclusion of territory.225 
In other areas of law, such as regulatory power, the Court has further 
eroded the importance of territory to tribal sovereignty.226  For example, in 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,227 the Court held that states 
cannot tax income earned exclusively in Indian Country.228  But in so deciding, 
Justice Thurgood Marshall relegated tribal territorial sovereignty to the 
“backdrop” against which Indian law issues should be decided.229  This is in 
contrast to the instruction from precedent that tribal sovereignty is a 
fundamental interest that the Court should protect barring only clear 
congressional law to the contrary.230  In Montana v. United States, the Court 
held that tribal governments can regulate within their territory.231  Just as in 
McClanahan, this was not a clear victory for proponents of tribal sovereignty.  
Instead of defining territory to include everything within the outer limits of the 
 
 221 John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 760 (Alaska 1999); David M. Blurton, John v. Baker and the Jurisdiction 
of Tribal Sovereigns Without Territorial Reach, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 21 (2003). 
 222 Dussias, supra note 51, at 11 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831)). 
 223 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that a non-Indian could not sue an Indian customer for an overdue debt 
in state court); Blumm & Cadigan, supra note 195, at 204, 210. 
 224 See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685–86 (1990) (rejecting an Indian tribe’s assertion of criminal 
jurisdiction over a nonmember); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (limiting Indian 
tribes’ criminal jurisdiction). 
 225 Dussias, supra note 51, at 34. 
 226 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (limiting the rights of tribes to regulate hunting and 
fishing).  The Court has been more generous in the context of civil law, allowing members and nonmembers 
access to tribal courts for civil disputes.  Dussias, supra note 51, at 44; see also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 
480 U.S. 9, 12 (1987) (holding that in a civil case a tribal court may be able to assert subject matter jurisdiction 
over a non-tribe member engaged in commercial relations with Indians on the reservation); Williams v. Lee, 
358 U.S. 217 (1959) (reversing dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of a tribal court to regulate 
non-tribal affairs). 
 227 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
 228 Id. at 165. 
 229 Id. at 172. 
 230 Blumm & Cadigan, supra note 195, at 204, 211. 
 231 450 U.S. 544, 545 (1981). 
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reservation, the Court defined territory based on who owned each parcel of 
land.232  The tribe could thus not regulate any “non-fee” land portion owned by 
a nonmember.233 
In sum, the Court has interpreted Justice Marshall’s conflation of territory 
and identity as supporting a pure identity-based definition of sovereignty.234  
The Court has privileged the portions of Justice Marshall’s opinion that speak 
of membership over territory.  But Justice Marshall’s opinions reflect the de 
jure and de facto segregation of his time, and there is no reason to believe that 
his interchangeable use of the terms “membership” and “territory” endorses 
one theory of sovereignty over the other. 
2. A Better Criminal Code 
The basis for sovereignty matters also because a territory-based theory of 
sovereignty leads to better and more modern laws.  When reservations were 
isolated and geographically removed, an identity-based jurisdictional scheme 
presented few problems.235  While Indian Country is still predominately rural, 
remote, and isolated,236 it has become more accessible to non-Indians in recent 
decades.237  A number of factors have contributed to this trend, including 
population growth, greater mobility, the dismantling of de jure segregation, 
and increased geographic, cultural, and racial integration.238 
Integration means Indian Country is accessible to non-Indians, including 
those who will commit crimes.  As more non-Indians move into tribal territory 
or onto surrounding lands, laws that depend on the identity of victims or 
suspects increasingly complicate policing in Indian Country.  Identity-based 
jurisdiction requires tribal law enforcement to deduce a suspect’s racial and 
tribal status based on superficial interactions.  This slows down investigations 
and allows for the release of non-Indian assailants following a determination 
that there is no tribal jurisdiction.  Rejecting a territory-based definition of 
 
 232 Id. at 560 n.9. 
 233 Id. at 565; Dussias, supra note 51, at 58, 62; see also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 409 (1989) (rejecting tribal authority to zone fee lands owned by non-
members within the reservation). 
 234 Holcomb, supra note 14, at 780. 
 235 See id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
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sovereignty weakens the ability of tribal governments to protect all reservation 
residents regardless of tribal membership or gender.239 
Proposals to enhance law enforcement in Indian Country without 
increasing tribal sovereignty will inevitably disappoint.  Without overturning 
Oliphant, tribes will still have less authority over criminal conduct within their 
territories than other sovereigns have over the same conduct.240  Outside 
prosecutions rob tribal leadership of an opportunity to strengthen tribal 
institutions and sovereignty.241  Policies placing control in federal rather than 
tribal authorities constrict tribal sovereignty and increase tribal dependence on 
the federal government.242 
B. Enforcement Benefits 
Tribal authorities are better suited to fight crime in Indian Country due, in 
part, to the sheer size of reservation lands, as well as the harsh climate that 
often prevails in the desert and mountainous terrain that characterizes much of 
Indian Country.243  Many tribes have assumed primary responsibility for law 
enforcement by successfully entering into agreements with state law 
enforcement officials244 or by decriminalizing unlawful conduct to impose civil 
sanctions instead.245  Tribal courts also currently provide the most “reliable and 
equitable adjudication” in Indian Country.246  Despite serious financial 
constraints, tribal authorities and courts work to bring true justice to the 
residents of Indian Country by being as protective of civil rights, if not more, 
as federal courts.247 
 
 239 Dussias, supra note 51, at 43. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Washburn, supra note 101, at 738. 
 242 Ellison, supra note 78, at 22. 
 243 A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 76. 
 244 E.g., Timothy J. Droske, Comment, The New Battleground for Public Law 280 Jurisdiction: Sex 
Offender Registration in Indian Country, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 897, 899 (2007) (noting that the Minnesota 
Attorney General and Minnesota tribes have entered into political agreements to resolve the issue of predatory 
offenders residing on tribal reservations). 
 245 See Catherine Baker Stetson, Decriminalizing Tribal Codes: A Response to Oliphant, 9 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 51 (1981). 
 246 A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 76. 
 247 Robert D. Probasco, Indian Tribes, Civil Rights, and Federal Courts, 7 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 119, 
152 (2001); Joseph Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003). 
PISARELLO GALLEYSFINAL 9/7/2010  10:25 AM 
1544 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
As of 2000, there were 171 tribal law enforcement agencies.248  Some tribal 
law enforcement agencies serve an area comparable to the largest county or 
regional police departments in the United States.249  Despite the difficulties 
tribal authorities face in policing such large territories, tribally operated 
agencies provide many services250 and have improved their transparency, 
participating in more reporting programs than in the past.251 
The number of tribal courts is growing, increasing the capacity of tribal 
courts to hear disputes that arise on reservations.252  Detention facilities are 
also growing to accommodate the increased police presence in Indian Country.  
About one-fourth of tribal law enforcement agencies run jails,253 and since 
2004, fifteen new facilities have opened in Indian Country, bringing the total 
number of jails to eighty-three.254  Together, these facilities can hold up to 
2,900 inmates, but recently the number of inmates totaled only 2,163.255  The 
capacity of these facilities has increased faster than the inmate population.256 
Greater sovereignty for tribal law enforcement could also decrease state 
involvement in Indian affairs in PL 280 states.  Under PL 280, states are 
allowed to enforce their criminal, but not their regulatory, laws in Indian 
Country.257  In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the Court 
 
 248 MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS FACT SHEET, TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, 
2000 FACT SHEET 1 (2000). 
 249 Id. at 2.  For example, the Navajo Nation Department of Law Enforcement covers 22,000 square miles 
across three states.  Id.  The police department in Reno, Nevada, has the same number of officers but serves 
only about 57.5 square miles.  Id. 
 250 Id. at 1.  “Nearly all [tribally operated agencies] (94%) responded to calls for service, and a large 
majority engaged in crime prevention activities (88%), executed arrest warrants (88%), performed traffic law 
enforcement (84%), and served court papers (76%).  A majority of agencies provided court security (56%) and 
search and rescue operations (53%).”  Id. 
 251 Id. at 3.  As of 2000, 84% of law enforcement entities in Indian Country reported statistics for crimes 
ranging from violent offenses to property offenses; this number is up from 71% in 1998.  Id. 
 252 Riley, supra note 174, at 835. 
 253 HICKMAN, supra note 248, at 1. 
 254 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAILS IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2008) [hereinafter JAILS IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY]. 
 255 Id.  In 2003, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that Indian Country jails were inadequate and 
fell short of basic professional standards.  A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 11, at 78.  However, the increase in 
capacity mentioned above is ameliorating many of those problems.  The reality is that facilities all over the 
United States are overcrowded.  See id.  Admittedly, there is still a need for more funding of tribal correctional 
facilities.  Id. 
 256 JAILS IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 254. 
 257 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
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developed a test to define which state laws are “criminal” and thus enforceable 
and which are “regulatory” and thus unenforceable.258 
A tribe’s perceived ability to police its territory sometimes influences 
courts’ application of the Cabazon test and tips the balance in favor of defining 
a state law as “regulatory” and thus unenforceable.259  If a tribe can enforce 
laws and codes through its own police, courts, and other dispute resolution 
mechanisms, then a state statute is more likely to be deemed regulatory.260  
Enhancing the sovereignty of tribal governments could thus influence non-
Indian courts to limit the number of laws they deem “criminal” and 
enforceable under PL 280. 
Shifting the primary responsibility for policing Indian Country to tribal law 
enforcement might also induce the federal government to invest more in tribal 
institutions.  The Department of the Interior has used concurrent jurisdiction as 
a justification for denying law enforcement and criminal justice funding to 
tribes.261  Increasing tribal jurisdiction could force the issue of federal funding 
to the forefront. 
Moreover, subjecting non-Indians to tribal law enforcement and 
adjudication could also lead to increased federal funding.  Complaints of due 
process abuses have historically had their roots in the financial weakness of 
tribal courts and the lack of training for their personnel.262  Tribal courts need 
more facilities, more personnel, and more technical assistance.263  The federal 
government continues to underfund tribal justice systems, signaling that it is 
not a federal priority to ensure the existence of a fair system of justice in Indian 
Country.264  Perhaps if non-Indians were to come before tribal courts, the 
federal government would provide tribal courts with more of the tools needed 
to safeguard defendants’ rights. 
 
 258 Id. 
 259 Foerster, supra note 79, at 1356; see also Confederated Tribes v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146, 149 (9th 
Cir. 1991). 
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 261 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 72, at 701–04; see also Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 
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Evidence suggests that Indian Country residents are more satisfied with the 
performance of tribal police than that of state or federal police.  Residents 
report that tribal police are more readily available for emergencies than their 
non-Indian counterparts.265  For example, residents of PL 280 states report that 
tribal police respond about twice as fast as state or county police in the same 
states.266  In addition, because tribal officers are more visible, they have a 
greater deterrent effect on crime.267 
Local tribal police officers benefit from their pre-existing relationships with 
community members—relationships that make tribal investigations more 
effective—and greater knowledge of Indian culture.  Indian Country residents 
also report that, despite sparse funding, tribal police conduct more thorough 
investigations than state and federal law enforcement.268  Tribal officers elicit 
more confessions since they have legitimacy to invoke community and tribal 
values269 and can better encourage defendants to take responsibility for actions 
that disrupt the community.270 
Tribal police in PL 280 states may already be filling the vacuum left by 
poor state response.271  For example, the success of cross-deputization 
agreements shows that tribal police authority over non-Indians can improve 
law enforcement in Indian Country.272  A cross-deputization agreement 
between tribal and county police will typically grant a tribal police officer the 
same authority as a county law enforcement officer.273  This enables tribal 
police to arrest both Indians and non-Indians for violations of state law,274 
which is very beneficial for tribes.275  Under some of these agreements, tribes 
can even enforce “regulatory” laws that are outside the state’s scope of 
authority under PL 280.276 
Tribal officers are also more accountable to Indian Country populations 
than state or federal officers.  Reservation residents want officers on patrol to 
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be more accountable to the community they police.277  Greater community 
control, accountability, and resources produce better results and increase 
community satisfaction.278  While outside officials focus on punitive goals,279 
an accountable tribal police force is more likely to also incorporate corrective 
goals in its strategy for combating crime in Indian Country.  A tribal police 
force can account for cultural and social factors that do not exist in the wider 
population.280 
C. Reducing Sexual Violence: Why Tribes Need Major Crimes Jurisdiction 
As one commentator has noted, “[t]he struggle for sovereignty and the 
struggle against sexual violence cannot be separated” because sexual violence 
is an attack on Indian sovereignty itself.281  Today, American Indian women 
are plagued by an epidemic of sexual assaults.282  While tribal institutions have 
developed traditional approaches for healing victims of sexual assault and 
domestic violence, these efforts cannot treat the root of the problem.  One 
prominent underlying cause is the jurisdictional structure of the criminal law, 
which creates perverse incentives for people to attack American Indian 
women.283  Thus, the criminal jurisdictional laws must change to win the 
struggle against sexual violence.  To combat sexual violence in Indian 
Country, tribal law enforcement officials must have the authority to apprehend 
both Indian and non-Indian suspects.284  This would create a much-needed 
coordinated community response to sexual assault.285 
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Some advocates propose extending tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
without tackling the ICRA’s sentencing limits.286  This would leave sexual 
assaults within the jurisdiction of the federal government.  But in the words of 
one member of Congress, “[t]he Federal Government has not been listening 
carefully enough to the advocates for our Native women. . . .  Providing the 
tribes with the law enforcement tools to protect our Native women [is key] to 
public safety in Indian Country.”287  If tribal law enforcement has authority 
over offenders but limited ability to punish those who commit crimes of sexual 
violence, extending tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians will confer less than 
ideal benefits.  Before tribal governments can tackle major crimes like rape, 
Congress must remove the one-year imprisonment and $5,000 fine limitations 
in the ICRA. 
Tribal law enforcement is the best institution for detecting and prosecuting 
sexual violence in Indian Country.288  Federal prosecutions by non-Indian 
authorities offer only a diluted condemnation of sexual violence.289  The nature 
of sexual violence makes trust and cultural sensitivity particularly necessary to 
counteract feelings of shame and humiliation.290  A woman must trust law 
enforcement officials enough to confide and cooperate with them; today, 
American Indian women have no such trust in the criminal justice system.291 
Understanding the wider context of historical oppression is necessary to 
effectively combat sexual assault in Indian Country.292  Non-Indian anti-rape 
efforts fail to consider how racism and a legacy of colonialism exacerbate 
rape.293  To fully heal from abuse, an American Indian woman can benefit 
from a strong cultural and spiritual identity that may overcome not only her 
own personal abuse but also “the patterned history of abuse against her family, 
her nation, and the environment in which she lives.”294  Otherwise, oppressive 
conditions and internalized victimization will continue to foster a climate in 
which sexual abuse is all too commonplace.295  The most effective programs 
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for healing are tribe-oriented and revive indigenous spirituality, culture, and 
sovereignty.296 
Tribal jurisdiction over all crimes in Indian Country also would secure a 
greater amount of tribal sovereignty and empower the entire community.297  
The systematic attack on the American Indian woman has been an historical 
barrier to tribal sovereignty.298  Strategies to oppress tribal cultures have 
consistently included the targeted degradation of American Indian women.299  
Strengthening a tribe’s power to enforce laws against all who come within its 
territory, no matter what the crime, is a basic step toward establishing more 
holistic territorial sovereignty.300  Restricting tribal jurisdiction based on the 
nature of a crime is just as much a rejection of territory-based sovereignty as 
restricting tribal jurisdiction based on the identity of the offender. 
The various cultural and governance roles American Indian women hold in 
many tribes suggests that if tribal governments acquired jurisdiction they 
would address the problem of violence against women.  Indian traditions 
generally embrace women in positions of political leadership and respect their 
right to hold property and enjoy exclusive dominion over production and 
subsistence activities.301  Clan mothers have commonly monopolized councils 
that name and remove chiefs, and these councils have had exclusive authority 
to declare and end war.302  Additionally, tribal common property systems often 
benefit women.303  Generally, tribes prioritize the safety of Indian women 
because they recognize that a tribe’s health depends on the health and safety of 
its women.304 
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Furthermore, the high rate of female political participation within the 
Indian community suggests that sexist traditionalism will not co-opt tribal 
politics.  Some argue that cultural relativism allows claims for sovereignty to 
license dominant members of a group, in this case men, to impose injustice on 
others in the group, in this case women.305  But empirically, Indian women are 
more highly represented in prestigious tribal leadership positions than are non-
Indian women in comparable American political institutions.306  American 
Indian women have rapidly risen to power in impressive numbers.307  In 1990, 
in nearly one-third of the tribal councils in Arizona a majority of elected 
officials were women.308  At that time, Wilma Mankiller was the elected leader 
of the Cherokee Nation, the largest American Indian tribe in the United 
States.309  In fact, women were chairpersons in six of the twenty federally 
recognized tribes in Arizona.310  This is analogous to having a female president 
and fifteen female governors in the United States at once.311 
The level of female participation in tribal governance suggests that violence 
against women will not be ignored if tribal governments assume more criminal 
jurisdiction.  This is not because female community and political leaders will 
necessarily align themselves with sexual assault victims, but rather it is 
because women’s high rates of political participation show a societal 
recognition that women’s issues and perspectives are important.  A system that 
values women’s issues is more likely to investigate and develop strategies to 
combat violence against women than a patriarchal system that depends on 
women’s subjugation for its identity. 
Many Indian communities in fact see improving gender equality as a 
requisite for improving tribal sovereignty: gender equality is itself Indian-
ness.312  Federal and state intrusions into tribal sovereignty have, in the past, 
worsened the condition of American Indian women by undermining tribal 
strategies for gender equality.  For example, the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 led directly to a disfranchisement of Indian women and decreased female 
political participation.313 
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Furthermore, while sexism may exist in Indian communities, it manifests 
itself in different ways than in dominant Western culture.314  Laws designed to 
address Western sexism may hurt tribal systems and yet fail to address sexism 
unique to tribal societies.315  As the Indian Reorganization Act example shows, 
federal laws can undermine typical Indian political guaranties based on gender, 
such as requirements that clan mothers serve on tribal councils.316 
CONCLUSION 
Some Indian scholars argue that sexual violence continues to be a tool of 
colonization and cultural domination.317  If this is so, legal barriers to the 
prosecution of sexual violence contribute to a larger pattern of assaults on 
tribal sovereignty.318  The high rates of sexual assault in Indian Country 
therefore require a more empowered tribal response.319  As long as tribes 
depend on external governments to police and prosecute, perpetrators and 
victims will continue to believe that anyone can get away with rape or murder 
in Indian Country.320 
Congress can counteract Oliphant by extending tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indian defendants.  Doing so would empower tribal governments and send a 
clear message that non-Indians must respect the rule of law.  Also, the 
limitation on the types of punishment that tribal courts may impose hampers 
the ability of tribal governments to deter or punish crimes that are neglected by 
state or federal authorities.321  By amending the ICRA, Congress can expressly 
provide tribal courts with jurisdiction over major crimes like rape. 
Criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and flexibility in sentencing are 
essential for tribes to manage internal affairs.322  Tribal justice systems find 
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themselves at a crucial point in their development.323  Empowering tribal law 
enforcement and courts is a necessary step to addressing the serious problem of 
crime in Indian Country.  Until tribal governments can exercise more authority 
to prosecute and punish defendants, American Indian women will continue to 
suffer violence at an alarming and unacceptable rate. 
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